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## Leszek Nowak's Non-Christian Model of Man and the Interdisciplinarity of the Humanities

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(Gniezno)

**LESZEK NOWAK'S NON-CHRISTIAN MODEL OF MAN  
AND THE INTERDISCIPLINARITY OF THE HUMANITIES**

**Abstract**

In the article, the author outlines the theory of action by Polish philosopher Leszek Nowak, the so-called non-Christian model of man, which may provide basis for the theoretical integration of various disciplines within humanities. The model overcomes the limitations of the concepts of rationality of action, originating from the assumption that the acting subject always maximizes their own preferences. Meanwhile, the discussed theory states that apart from the principle of rationality the principles in force in human life include the principle of counter-rationality and irrationality, which consist in maximisation of someone else's, not one's own, preferences and counter-preferences, respectively. The previous applications and expansions of the non-Christian model described in the article demonstrate that the model has been used in the analysis of political, economic and cultural phenomena. Hence, the model may be a cognitively useful foundation for conducting interdisciplinary research.

**Key words**

Interdisciplinarity, integration of humanities, model of action, rationality of action, practical rationality, non-Christian model of man.

When discussing the conduct of scientific research in an interdisciplinary manner, one may have three distinct phenomena in mind. First, one may be speaking of ontological integration, which consists in establishing a common objective domain which is subjected to cognition. The integrative combining of research takes place only at the level of object, without care given to cohesion of results obtained from the perspective of various scientific disciplines. Second, one might mean methodological integration, consisting in the adoption of a single set of methodological premises which guides the cognitive process. In this case, not only the shared object is designated, but also an attempt is made to specify one methodological pattern for individual disciplines, which renders it possible to compare and verify the results obtained in individual disciplines. Third, interdisciplinarity may be discussed in terms of theoretical integration, consisting in the adoption of a homogenous theory, whose solutions serve to explain the studied phenomena. Theoretical integration is the most complete one; apart from determination of the common object and research method, one also embraces one set of theoretical assumptions, which enables one to arrive at a cohesive picture of the studied phenomena.

The attempts at theoretical integration in humanities, the very issue addressed here, were made relying on the theory of action, which was utilised as the basis for the studies of phenomena as part of various disciplines. One of the theories of action which played an important role in the integration of humanist research is the concept of rational action<sup>1</sup>. Although practical rationality is claimed to have its sources already in the treatises of Aristotle, systematic formulation of the concept was a thing of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Beginning with the works of Max Weber, the creator of the so-called comprehensive sociology, who presented a classification of human actions which, among other things, encom-

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<sup>1</sup>Apart from the concept of rational action, a theory which was hoped to integrate sciences about the human was behaviourism, propounded by I.P. Pawłow, J.B. Watson, B.F. Skinner, G.C. Homans, among others. It postulates observation of behaviour of the studied individuals depending on the stimulus they feel, whereby two major types of stimuli are distinguished: punishment and reward. According to behaviourists, systematization of possible responses and diverse stimuli would enable creation of a platform for joint analyses of experts in various social sciences (psychology, economics, sociology, pedagogy and others) and biological sciences about behaviour (etology). In Poland, the role which may be played by the behaviourist theory in the integration of humanities was discussed by e.g. Andrzej Malewski; for more see: A. Malewski, *O nowy kształt nauk społecznych*. Pisma zebrane, Warszawa 1975, especially p. 331–346.

passed the rationally purposeful actions<sup>2</sup>, the concept of practical rationality was developed by numerous scholars. One should also mention the current of methodological individualism, which postulated explaining social phenomena by reducing them to individual human actions proached in terms of rationality. Methodological individualism was employed as research paradigm by K.R. Popper<sup>3</sup> and J. Watkins<sup>4</sup>. In Poland, rationality of human actions was studied by such scholars as K. Szaniawski<sup>5</sup>, J. Kmita<sup>6</sup> and L. Nowak<sup>7</sup>.

From among the many formulations of rationality of the subject taking an action, let us quote J. Watkins, for instance, who defines the principle of rationality thus: "A given individual finds themselves in a certain objectively problematic situation. The individual has certain goals, desires, preferences or perhaps just one goal, and makes factual assessments (which may be incorrect) of their problematic situation. The principle of rationality says that the individual will act in a manner which is "appropriate" considering their goal(s) and the assessment of situation"<sup>8</sup>.

In turn, J. Kmita formulates rationality assumptions in the more technical language of actions, their outcomes and the preferences of the acting subject. The assumption states that „If  $X$  (in time  $t$ ) is to undertake one of the actions  $C_1, \dots, C_n$ , which to his knowledge (in time  $t$ ) are mutually exclusive and (combined) complement one another and infallibly lead — respectively — to results  $S_1, \dots, S_m$  ( $m \leq n$ ), where results  $S_1, \dots, S_m$  are ordered by  $X$ 's characteristic (in time  $t$ ) relation of preference, then  $X$  (in time  $t$ ) will undertake action

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<sup>2</sup>As the author states, rationally purposeful action is determined by "expectations concerning behaviour of objects of the outside worlds and other people, when they are taken as "conditions" or "means" in the rational pursuit of one's own ends (outcomes) which are contemplated in detail". M. Weber, *Gospodarka i społeczeństwo*, Warszawa 2002, p. 18.

<sup>3</sup>K.R. Popper, *Mit schematu pojęciowego. W obronie nauki i racjonalności*, Warszawa 1997; idem, *Spółeczeństwo otwarte i jego wrogowie 2*, Warszawa 1993.

<sup>4</sup>J. Watkins, *Wyjaśnianie historii. Indywidualizm metodologiczny i teoria decyzji w naukach społecznych*, Wrocław 2001.

<sup>5</sup>K. Szaniawski, *O nauce, rozumowaniu i wartościach*, Warszawa 1994.

<sup>6</sup>J. Kmita, *Z metodologicznych problemów interpretacji humanistycznej*, Warszawa 1971.

<sup>7</sup>L. Nowak, *O granicach paradygmatu racjonalistycznego*, [in:] K. Zamiara (ed.), *Humanistyka jako autorefleksja kultury*, Poznań 1993/95; idem, *Człowiek i ludzie. Modele z Gombrowicza*, Warszawa 2000.

<sup>8</sup>J. Watkins, *Wyjaśnianie historii...*, p. 77.

$C_i (i = 1, \dots, n)$  associated with the dominant (i.e. the preferred highest ranking) result  $S_j (j = 1, \dots, m)$ <sup>9</sup>.

The model of rational action is employed in many branches of knowledge, thus establishing a theoretical plane which integrates research in various disciplines of science. The discussed model is utilised in economics, sociology and pedagogy, in political sciences, law studies and history. Also philosophers direct their attention to practical rationality, using the concept either as a tool in the explanation of social phenomena (social philosophy, philosophy of history), or as the object of consideration (philosophy of action, praxeology, methodology).

The rationality model possesses numerous advantages. It allows for a systematic reconstruction of the decision-taking situation of the acting subject, which enables elucidation of an extensive class of actions with regard to the goals of the acting subject and the usefulness of alternative actions. Still, some scholars point to the limitations of the concept of practical rationality. Thomas C. Schelling, a well-known American economist and a 2005 Nobel prize winner, stated the following in one of his few lectures in Poland: "In economics, it is assumed that every person taking a decision knows what their choice is, is capable of correct assessment of other available possibilities, realizes the limitations inherent in each of the choices, so as to make a choice that will be 'optimal'. This assumption is an important element of intellectual consideration, thanks to which useful outcomes may be achieved at minor cost. The economists find the assumption so attractive that most of them pays little attention to that point at which rational choice may be a failure. Rational choice won the favour of political sciences and sociology in the United States and still enjoys tremendous appreciation. In a sense, it is received with almost excessive enthusiasm, I am therefore of the opinion that those who are exaggeratedly fond of it, will eventually come to see its limitations"<sup>10</sup>.

One of such limitations is the premise stating that the rational subject always maximizes their own preferences, i.e. when taking decision which action to take they are guided by their own goals that they wish to attain. However, this is not always the case. In our behaviour, we are frequently guided by the preferences of other persons, sometimes the decisions are enforced by others, and sometimes we are not even conscious that we want to ingratiate ourselves with the superior, teacher or political authority and act according to the preferences of

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<sup>9</sup>J. Kmita, *Z metodologicznych...*, p. 28.

<sup>10</sup>T.C. Schelling, *Racjonalność i jej alternatywy*, Kraków 2006, p. 11.

those very persons, not our own. It also happens that instead of pursuing our own designs, we attempt to thwart the plans of another at any cost, in which situation we consider the states of affairs which are least preferred by that person. Such circumstances, occurring relatively often in social life, were given the following literary depiction by Witold Gombrowicz: "verily, in the world of spirit there is permanent violation, we are not intrinsic, we are but a function of other people, we have to be as they see us"<sup>11</sup>.

The above limitation of the rationality model induced Leszek Nowak, a philosopher of the Poznań methodological school, to attempt to overcome this limitation. The work of the Poznań scholar yielded conceptualisation of an original theory of action, namely the non-Christian model of man. In the following sections, I would like to introduce the theory, as it appears that it might become a theoretical foundation for designing study projects of interdisciplinary nature. It seems that Nowak's concept, by virtue of invalidating the limitation of the rationality model, may be treated by researchers representing various branches of humanities as an anthropological premise of greater cognitive efficacy.

## CONCEPTUAL SOURCES OF THE NON-CHRISTIAN MODEL

Leszek Nowak is an author of several original philosophical concepts<sup>12</sup>. One of these is the non-Christian model of man<sup>13</sup>. Initially, the non-Christian mode was conceptualised as an anthropological premise in social theory of the non-Marxist historical materialism, a domain in which Nowak made innovative contributions in the 1970s and the 1980s, developing materialist vision of the

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<sup>11</sup>W. Gombrowicz, *Ferdydurke*, Kraków 1997, p. 12.

<sup>12</sup>Besides original interpretation of concepts by other authors (e.g. adaptational interpretation of Marx's historical materialism, categorical interpretation of dialectics), and apart from the non-Christian model of man, one should mention the idealisational theory of science, non-Marxian historical materialism and negativistic unitary metaphysics.

<sup>13</sup>A detailed disquisition of the discussed concept may be found in: L. Nowak, *U podstaw teorii socjalizmu*, 3: *Dynamika władzy. O strukturze i konieczności zaniku socjalizmu*, Poznań 1991; see also in: idem, *Człowiek i ludzie, czyli ile utopii społecznej daje się wyprowadzić na obecnym etapie konkretyzacji nie-Marksowskiego materializmu historycznego*, *Obecność* 9, 1985; idem, *O podwójnej herezji w filozofii społecznej*, *Twórczość* 11, 1987; idem, *Two Inter-Human Limits to the Rationality of Man*, [in:] L. Nowak, M. Paprzycki (eds.), *Social System, Rationality and Revolution*, *Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and Humanities* 33, Amsterdam–Atlanta 1993; idem, *Człowiek i ludzie...*

social process while overcoming conceptual restrictions of Marx's historiography. However, the systematically devised non-Christian model proved to be such an interesting vision of the human that it became an autonomous concept, developed, applied and criticised by scholars of different scientific backgrounds, who recognised the explanatory potential inherent in the discussed theory.

Leszek Nowak's deliberations on the theory of action set out from the model of decisional rationality, which the author formulates as follows: "from the available alternative actions, the rational subject chooses the one which to their knowledge leads to the result that ranks highest in their preferences"<sup>14</sup>.

One of the characteristic features of the human described by the rationality model is their taking action in accordance with the principle of maximising their own preferences. The principle states that normal, mature people will always be guided in their actions by maximisation of their own preferences, i.e. will choose that action from the set of alternative actions which achieves the intended goal to a maximum degree. The principle was precisely explicated in the language of preferences.

It is namely assumed that for a given person ( $X, Y, \dots$ ) there exists a preference relation  $P$  which organizes the set of states of affairs due to a certain value  $W$ <sup>15</sup>:

$$P: p_{-m}, \dots, p_{-2}, p_{-1}, p_0, p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n.$$

The preference relation encompasses the neutral state  $p_0$ , as well as states of affairs ranked higher in order of preference than the neutral state  $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n$  — these are the goods of the given person, and states of affairs ranking lower than the neutral state  $p_{-m}, \dots, p_{-2}, p_{-1}$  — these are the evils of the individual.

Hence, rational subject's maximisation of their own preferences consists in selecting such an action associated with the value  $W$ , which achieves the state of affairs that is most highly valued in the light of preferences of the acting entity.

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<sup>14</sup>L. Nowak, *U podstaw...*, p. 27. In a different formulation "from the available alternatives, the rational individual chooses that action which, according to the knowledge they possess, maximizes their own preferences". Idem, *Człowiek i ludzie...*, op. cit., p. 79. Furthermore, Nowak discussed rationality of action in: idem, *Założenia prawniczego pojęcia czynu*, *Prakseologia* 2(50), 1974; idem, *O granicach...*; J. Kmita, L. Nowak, *Studia nad teoretycznymi podstawami humanistyki*, Poznań 1968; J. Kmita, L. Nowak, *O racjonalizującym charakterze badań humanistycznych*, *Studia filozoficzne* 5 (60), Warszawa 1969.

<sup>15</sup>L. Nowak, *U podstaw...*, p. 30.

Nowak saw philosophical sources of the rational concept of the human in Christian ethics, in particular in the norm of “love thy enemy”<sup>16</sup>. The precept seems reasonable only when it is assumed that the kindness shown to a hostile person will make them change their conduct and display kindness: selfless kindness transforms the malefactor into a person loving their neighbour. In other words, the Christian norm ordaining love towards enemies is a reasonable ethical postulate only when one assumes linear interdependency of mutual attitudes of kindness and enmity: the attitudes of two persons towards each other are aligned according to a linear relationship: the more hostile *X* is towards *Y*, the more hostile *Y* is towards *X*, whereas the more kindness is shown by *X* to *Y*, the more kindly disposed *Y* is towards *X*<sup>17</sup>. Whereby: “benevolence of a person *Y* towards *X* is his readiness to bring about *X*'s good, while *Y*'s malevolence towards *X* is his readiness to bring about *X*'s evils”<sup>18</sup>.

The discussed relationship of the Christian model may be represented as below:




Fig. 1. Diagram of the Christian model of man: axis *OX* illustrates potential attitudes of person *X* (hostility or kindness), while axis *OY* illustrates the potential responses of *Y* to *X*'s attitude. Thus, the relation between *Y*'s attitude with regard to *X*'s attitude is as follows: confronted with *X*'s hostility towards *Y*, *Y* always responds with hostility; kindness of *X*'s towards *Y* always engenders *Y*'s kind response

<sup>16</sup>For this reason, Nowak's anthropological approach is termed by the author as “non-Christian model of man”, as it represents a substantial modification of the Christian model, interpreted on the basis of the New Testament ethics. The issue of terminology of the discussed model is addressed by K. Brzechczyn, *Odrębność historyczna Europy Środkowej. Studium metodologiczne*, Poznań 1998.

<sup>17</sup>L. Nowak, *U podstaw...*, p. 31.

<sup>18</sup>Idem, *Two Inter-Human...*, p. 198.



The above relationship between mutual attitudes of two persons was subjected to critique. Nowak argues that the relationship does not function in the entire range of possible interactions between human beings. It is valid only in the situation when hostility (and, analogically, kindness) of one persons towards the other is at average values, but does not exceed a certain borderline intensity, i.e. is within the limits of “normal hostility” (and, analogically, “normal kindness”).

### NON-CHRISTIAN MODEL: FUNDAMENTAL PREMISES

The element underlying the conceptualisation<sup>19</sup> of original anthropological theses comprised in the non-Christian model of man is the applicability limitation of the Christian model: it pertains only to the domain of the so-called normal social relations. Usually, hostility and kindness take average values in human interaction. Nevertheless, social life involves relations where the displayed hostility and kindness reach extreme intensity. It is precisely in such situations that the principle of preference maximisation cannot be applied. In other words, Nowak rejected the premise on which the rationality concept was founded, according to which the individual always maximises their own preferences exclusively. This enabled the author to effect a modification of the rationality model and distinguish three specific situations of human interaction. These include the normal situation and the situations of enslavement and satanization:

(i) normal situation — when a given individual responds with evil to evil done, and reciprocates good with good;

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<sup>19</sup>Nowak conceptualised the discussed model of the human using idealisational methodological apparatus, whereby the studied phenomena are systematically simplified by virtue of the adopted idealising assumption. Hence, the non-Christian model adopts the following idealising assumptions: a) partners to an interaction are individual subjects — the categories of social group, social surroundings etc, are therefore ignored; b) preferences and conduct of the interaction partners are known to them — therefore the distinction between preferences nurtured and declared may be omitted; c) the value systems of the interaction partners consist of one value only — hence one discounts the problem of value hierarchisation, the conflict of individual values etc.; d) there is a linear arrangement to individual states of affairs which realise the values of interaction partners — thus the situation where there exist sets of equally valuable states of affairs may be disregarded. For more on the methodology of idealisation and concretization see: L. Nowak, *Wstęp do idealizacyjnej teorii nauki*, Warszawa 1977.

(ii) situation of enslavement — when a given individual, experiencing extreme evil, responds not with evil but with good (extreme evil enslaves the given individual and causes it to realize the preferences of the malefactor);

(iii) situation of satanization — when a given individual does not respond with good to extreme good, but with evil (extreme good leads to the so-called satanization and causes the given individual to realize counter-preferences of the benefactor).

Having distinguished the three situations occurring between human beings, the author was able to formulate two principles of extra-rational action, besides the rationality principle which presupposes maximisation of individual preferences<sup>20</sup>:

for the situation of enslavement — the principle of counter-rationality: “from the set of alternative actions, one takes the action which is believed to lead to a result that ranks highest among the preferences of the oppressor”;

for the situation of satanization — the principle of irrationality: “from the set of alternative actions, one takes the action which is believed to lead to a result that ranks lowest among the preferences of the benefactor”.

Consequently, the non-Christian approach restricts the applicability of the rationality model to the domain of normal social relationships, where the individual is neither enslaved nor satanized. The two latter situations induce the individual not to maximise their preferences but, respectively, the preferences of the oppressor or counter-preferences of the benefactor. Thus, in a situation of enslavement, the person responds with kindness to the hostility shown (acts counter-rationally), whereas in the situation of satanization, the kindness displayed is reciprocated with hostility (acts irrationally).

Nowak illustrates enslavement demonstrating cases of “breaking” inmates in concentration camps. Adequately long and powerful pressure not only enforced subordination of the prisoners to the camp norms, but also interfered with their consciousness to a far greater extent, making them into persons totally enslaved, who adopted the hierarchy of values of the camp’s supervisors. This kind of enslavement is not only true in prison realities; it is also found in the social life of totalitarian systems. It is sufficient to mention the few telling images which reach the Western world from North Korea, where the conduct of people, almost every single act seems to carry out the will of the political elite, not the acting individual. Also literature provides numerous depictions

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<sup>20</sup>Idem, *U podstaw...*, p. 51.

of enslavement, which aptly capture the truth about the pathological kindness towards the oppressor. In George Orwell's *1984*, Winston, the protagonist, is tortured into giving up his independent thinking and into pathological love of the Big Brother.

In turn, satanization is clearly discernible in the situation where the overprotective parents try to satisfy all whims of the child to the fullest extent, which frequently causes annoyance and the child's increasing dissatisfaction. The category of satanization applies well in situations when increasing kindness, e.g. in the shape of more and more expensive gifts, is countered by the recipient with decreasing gratitude, and at a certain point with refusal, which may be interpreted as hostile.

The dependencies described in the non-Christian model may be represented as follows<sup>21</sup>:




Fig. 2. The dependencies in the non-Christian model of man:  $Z_n$  — situation of  $Y$ 's enslavement by  $X$ , where  $X$ 's hostility is extremely high;  $Z_b$  — situation of  $Y$ 's satanization, where the  $X$ 's kindness towards  $Y$  is extremely high;  $N$  — normal situation, where  $X$ 's hostility and kindness towards  $Y$  assume average values

The mutual attitudes of individuals in the non-Christian model encompass cases of typical relationships. Next to those, peculiar attitudes have been specified, which in the interactions of hostility and kindness take a slightly different course<sup>22</sup>.

<sup>21</sup>Ibidem, p. 37.

<sup>22</sup>Ibidem, p. 38.

One of the peculiar attitudes explained by means of the non-Christian model is the so-called benefactor, or the person who always adopts the kindly approach, irrespective of the approach adopted by the interaction partner. Malefactor is a peculiar attitude opposed to the benefactor, in other words someone who always displays hostility towards the partner, regardless of whether the latter shows hostility or kindness. In turn, the rebel attitude describes a person who does not allow themselves to be enslaved, i.e. they do not respond with pathological kindness even to extreme hostility, but always retains hostile attitude; elsewhere, the rebel demonstrates standard regularities, responding with kindness to moderate kindness, whereas confronted with extreme kindness becomes satanised and responds with hostility. A peculiar attitude opposed to rebel's is represented by the god-fearing person: even in the case of extreme kindness they respond with kindness; in other areas the god-fearing behaves in accordance with the standard pattern of interaction, responding to moderate hostility with hostility, and shifting to enslavement and pathological kindness when confronted with extreme hostility.

## APPLICATIONS AND EXPANSIONS

The non-Christian model of man has been used in the analyses of diverse social phenomena. Leszek Nowak employed the non-Christian approach as an anthropological premise in the theory of non-Marxian historical materialism, explaining the global mechanisms of social development<sup>23</sup>, which were hardly comprehensible in the light of the rationalist concept of the human. Originally, the non-Christian model was utilised only in a segment of the theory, namely to elucidate the phenomena within the sphere of political power. Then Krzysztof Brzechczyn used it as well in the economic sphere of the society and thus

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<sup>23</sup>A systematic outline of the theory of non-Marxian historical materialism may be found in: L. Nowak, *U podstaw teorii socjalizmu 1: Własność i władza. O konieczności socjalizmu; 2: Droga do socjalizmu. O konieczności socjalizmu w Rosji; 3: Dynamika władzy. O strukturze i konieczności zaniku socjalizmu*, Poznań 1991. Furthermore, the theory has had multiple expansions and modifications; it would not be possible to quote all of them here (many papers may be found in the series *Poznańskie Studia z Filozofii Nauki i Humanistyki*). Let us at least note the most recent monograph devoted to the theory of non-Marxian historical materialism by K. Brzechczyn, who interprets the evolution of the Mexican society in the light of that very theory; see: K. Brzechczyn, *O wielości linii rozwojowych w procesie historycznym. Próba interpretacji ewolucji społeczeństwa meksykańskiego*, Poznań 2004.

unified the theory of non-Marxian historical materialism in terms of anthropological premises<sup>24</sup>.

The basic notion of the theory of political power in non-Marxian historical materialism is ruling, which is defined in the categories of preferences of the acting persons. As Nowak states: “We shall say that person *Y* potentially rules person *X* if and only if *Y* is capable of creating states of affairs to which *X* responds with enslavement, and therefore a proclivity to realise the preferences of *Y*”<sup>25</sup>.

Ruling thus construed is founded on one of the principles of action in the non-Christian model, namely on the principle of counter-rationality, according to which the individual undertakes such action from the set of alternative actions which is thought to achieve the state of affairs given the highest preference by the one who enslaves. In a way, the enslaved takes over the bundle of preferences from their oppressor.

This baseline definition serves to explain the subsequent notion in the theory of power. These include the class ruling<sup>26</sup>, the class of rulers<sup>27</sup>, sphere of influence<sup>28</sup>, range of ruler’s regulation<sup>29</sup>. Nowak employs these notions to present the mechanisms of exercising political power and the dynamic of the development of political society. Without going into too much detail, let us list the possible relationships between the class of political rulers and the class of citizens: social peace (low degree of regulation by the rulers does not engender resistance against political power), area of type I revolution (average level of regulation by authority causes resistance of the citizens, which in extreme form assumes the shape of revolution), the area of enslavement (high level of

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<sup>24</sup>Initially, the economic model of the theory of non-Marxian historical materialism was based on the concept of rational action, however, the adoption of the non-Christian model rendered it possible to explain additional theoretical theses and to refine the existing ones. See: K. Brzechczyn, *O wielości...*

<sup>25</sup>L. Nowak, *U podstaw...*, p. 50.

<sup>26</sup>Nowak writes: “The smallest set of individuals in a given society who jointly dispose of the means to rule available in that society we shall call the ruling class in that society”. *Ibidem*, p. 52.

<sup>27</sup>“The ruling class which disposes of the means of coercion is the class of rulers in a given society; its remaining part is the class of citizens”. *Ibidem*, p. 54.

<sup>28</sup>“We will say that the sphere of influence of a given individual is the set of civic actions that the individual has enslaved”. *Ibidem*, p. 55.

<sup>29</sup>“Each ruler has a certain sphere of influence. The total of influence spheres of all rulers is the range of ruler’s regulation”. *Ibidem*.

regulation causes disintegration of revolutionary centres and enslavement of citizens, whose inclination to resistance against political power atrophies) and the area of type II revolution (extreme level of regulation triggers one of the peculiar attitudes — the rebel attitude which contributes to the propagation of resistance against political power among the enslaved citizens)<sup>30</sup>.

Originally, the theory of non-Marxian historical materialism conceptualised the sphere of economic phenomena under the presumption of rational action. The theses of the non-Christian model of man were introduced by Krzysztof Brzechczyn with the purpose of accounting for the economic phenomena within the theory, unifying the theory of power and economy in non-Marxian historical materialism in that respect.

Having accepted the premises of the non-Christian model of man, Brzechczyn was able to define the notion of economic control and the economic ruling; let us quote Brzechczyn, who defines economic control thus: "In economy, increasing social influence is not direct, but takes place through maximisation of profit. A negative sanction for *A* (direct manufacturer) is reducing their income by *B* (the owner). The fact that *A* determines the amount of *B*'s income is a means inducing *A* to nonfeasance or to perform certain action preferred by *B* — e.g. combining workforce *A* with the means of production"<sup>31</sup>. Meanwhile, the notion of economic ruling presupposes not only control, but also a transformation of the preference system: "the rule of *B* over *A* will ensue in such economic situation of *A*, in which the latter adopts the system of preferences harboured by *B*"<sup>32</sup>.

And analogically to the theory of power, the anthropological premise in the form of the non-Christian model of man allows one to distinguish the specific spheres of relationships between the class of the owners and the direct producers<sup>33</sup>. Compared to the original premise, i.e. the model of rational action, which provided the basis for the theory of economic society, the non-Christian model yielded two additional areas of economic relationships. Apart from the social peace (the level of income of the direct producers is sufficiently high to

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<sup>30</sup>Enslavement represents one facet of the relation political power — citizens, the second facet of this relation is based on the phenomenon defined in the non-Christian model of man as satanization; I shall omit this thread so as not to dwell on it too long. For more on this topic see: *ibidem*, p. 63–67.

<sup>31</sup>K. Brzechczyn, *Odrębność historyczna...*, p. 163.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibidem*.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 163–165.

satisfy most needs of the direct producers) and the type I revolution (the level of income is moderately low, which in consequence means moderately low level of satisfaction of needs and provokes mass disturbances, e.g. strikes), the anthropological premise introduced by Brzechczyn allows for the conceptualisation of the declassing (low level of income leads to low capacity of satisfying basic needs, which paralyzes the possibility of taking a stand against the class of owners and causes propagation of the attitudes of “pathological productivity”) and the area of type II revolution (extremely low income causes failure to satisfy basic biological needs and triggers activation of the peculiar attitude: the rebel and in consequence propagation of local disturbances). Therefore the theses of the non-Christian model of man introduced into the theory of economic society within non-Marxian historical materialism facilitate conceptualisation of two kinds of revolution: the revolutions undertaken by direct producers in order to preserve what they hold, and revolutions undertaken to sustain biological existence by the desperate employees on the verge of survival<sup>34</sup>.

Katarzyna Paprzycka and Marcin Paprzycki presented a certain expansion of the non-Christian model of man<sup>35</sup>. These authors attempt to solve a problem of the non-Marxian historical materialism, which is based on the anthropological premise in the form of the discussed model of man. The problem in question is the phenomenon of the so-called type II revolution where, in the state of total enslavement of all citizens of a given society, the activity of the peculiar attitude of the “rebel” engenders a civic revival and the propagation of mass resistance against the enslaving class<sup>36</sup>. The initial non-Christian model did not admit taking hostile action by the enslaved individuals and thus did not provide a sound anthropological basis for the phenomenon of revolution of the second type.<sup>37</sup>

In their text, the authors draw on certain psychological notions originating from the theory of attribution, which claims that having performed an action,

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<sup>34</sup>Ibidem, p. 165–168.

<sup>35</sup>I present the essential concept of expansion to the non-Christian model of man by K. Paprzycka and M. Paprzycki. The method of explication as well as other issues addressed by the authors, albeit interesting, are not discussed here. For more see: K. Paprzycka, M. Paprzycki, *How Do Enslaved People Make Revolutions?*, [in:] L. Nowak, M. Paprzycki (eds.), *Social System...*

<sup>36</sup>The authors address only the theory of power, since incorporation of the theses of the non-Christian model of man into the theory of property was effected later. Nevertheless, it seems that the conclusions of the authors may also be related to the revolution of the second type in the economic sphere of society.

<sup>37</sup>K. Paprzycka, M. Paprzycki, *How Do...*, p. 253–254.

the individual will seek to rationalise it<sup>38</sup>. Therefore, they draw attention to the fact that our actions are not only influenced by the attitudes of other people but also by the knowledge which allows us to rationalise our actions. Katarzyna Paprzycka and Marcin Paprzycki argue that including selected theses of the theory of attribution expands the non-Christian model of man and justifies the phenomenon of the type II revolution, which so far had been anthropologically problematic. The hostile action of the enslaved person against the oppressor, which in the mass dimension manifests itself as the resistance of the enslaved civil class against the class of enslaving rulers, are possible only when the enslaved individual fails to rationalise satisfactorily their subservient attitude — this takes place where there is extreme hostility on the part of the enslaving side and insufficient system of convictions which effectively rationalizes the actions of the enslaved. Then, the individual looks for alternative methods of rationalisation, which also includes methods of revolutionary nature, compelling one to resistance against the enslaving entity. This, in turn, allows one to undertake hostile action which, having spread widely, lead to the revolution of the second type. Consequently, the bell curve which describes enslavement in the initial non-Christian model of man is replaced by the authors with a double bell curve<sup>39</sup>, or one which at high intensity of hostility on the part of the enslaving entity, re-activates hostile action against them.

Leszek Nowak also suggested an expansion to the non-Christian model. He utilised the terms and notions of the discussed model to interpret the literary intuitions concerning the social nature of the human being expressed by Witold Gombrowicz. Both Gombrowicz and Nowak base their concepts on identical fundamental thesis describing human condition. As Nowak observes: “The important thing is that here, Gombrowicz goes beyond the rationalism of the ancient Greeks; perhaps not for the first time, but never before so radically, on such a scale. Namely, the manner in which we gather convictions in life’s practice is decidedly at odds with the rationalist canon. It is not “logic” that guides a person in everyday life when seeking their convictions, but the convictions this person finds in other people. This is not reality that imposes judgements on us, by means of some “reasons” that we later agree upon with ourselves inside

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<sup>38</sup>Ibidem, p. 255.

<sup>39</sup>Ibidem, p. 260.



our minds, so as to arrive at a most balanced and objective conviction, but this conviction is imposed upon us by other inhabitants of the human world”<sup>40</sup>.

Nowak’s non-Christian concept of the human also contains a fundamental conviction about the interpersonal nature of the human. The actions of individuals, says the author, do not depend solely on ourselves, being, as it were, “designated” by the situation in which the acting ones find themselves: “The line of their behaviour is a functional dependency, in which behaviours of the environment are the argument and the individual’s own behaviour provide the values”<sup>41</sup>.

The basic non-Christian model presents the possible attitudes that a given individual may adopt depending on the behaviour of the interaction partner. These attitudes — as already observed — are conceptualised based on the kindness and hostility of one individual towards the other.

The above model was concretised by virtue of the simplifying assumption that in an interaction, an individual is partner to another individual. Meanwhile, as envisaged by the author of “Ferdurdurke”, human actions and attitudes are shaped by the social surroundings, not by individuals. Therefore, the “Gombrowicz’s Correction” consists in introducing a different independent variable which represents an interaction partner for a given subject: “the ideas of Gombrowiczian provenance require that for the ‘independent variable’ *X* one should take the social surroundings of the individual *Y*, not *Y*’s partner-individual”<sup>42</sup>.

Taking social surroundings into account instead of single partner-individual of interaction, modifies the relationship between the attitude adopted by a given person and their social environment. This follows from the fact that the attitude a human adopts with regard to another individual differs from the one displayed towards the entirety of the social environment in which they live. Nowak writes: “Even if we encounter indifference from the social environment, we do not reciprocate it with indifference but with kindness. Each of us becomes attached to the environment in which we normally live, to our little homeland [...]. In other words, the sphere of kindness of an individual towards the social

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<sup>40</sup>L. Nowak, *Człowiek i ludzie...*, p. 153–154.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 65. And elsewhere: “It is not in one’s mind, deliberating on the “pros” and “cons”, and then (as one can) weighing them dispassionately that one comes to their convictions, but in a social game with other people” *Ibidem*, p. 153.

<sup>42</sup>*Idem*, *Gombrowicza model świadomości (między)ludzkiej*, [in:] A. Falkiewicz, L. Nowak (eds.), *Przestrzeń świadomości. Studia z filozofii literatury, Poznańskie Studia z Filozofii Humanistyki* 16, 1996, p. 185.

environment in which they live is much more extensive than in the case of individual-to-individual relationships<sup>43</sup>.

The human is more compliant towards the social environment than they are towards individual people. Confronted with low level of hostility from the social environment, the individual does not respond with hostility but with kindness, and when the hostility increases a little, the response is indifference. In the case of single individuals the situation is different, where even at low level of hostility the persons respond with hostility as well.

Concretization of the model following Gombrowiczian correction may be illustrated as follows:




Fig 3. The non-Christian model of man with Gombrowiczian correction; parameters analogous to Fig. 2. The curve does not cross the beginning of the axis  $OY$ , but runs below axis  $OX$ , as  $Y$ 's area of kindness towards social environment is larger than towards individual, as in the initial model

Interpreting Gombrowiczian thought in the language of the non-Christian model made it possible to describe the phenomenon of cultural provincialism. Nowak writes: "Who is a provincial? This is someone who is unable to formulate their own judgements, but forwards the judgement of the 'centre' to an even more remote province. It is someone who is spiritually subordinated to the 'centre' while claiming domination over the province which is still farther away"<sup>44</sup>. The relation of scientific domination, an important cultural domain, is thus explicated in terms of spiritual enslavement: „*X cognitively dominates Y* when

<sup>43</sup>Idem, *Człowiek i ludzie...*, p. 67.

<sup>44</sup>Ibidem, p. 179.

Y concedes the right to creativity to X, while granting itself no more than the right to correct or apply the ideas of X (which are deemed creative)<sup>45</sup>.

## DISCUSSION AND CRITICISM

Another interpretation of the non-Christian model of man was presented by Marcin Paprzycki. The author resorts to the fundamental categories of Freud's psychoanalysis, including id, ego and superego, as well as Freudian notion of anxiety as a consequence of shortage of ability to overcome difficulties in a situation of threat<sup>46</sup>.

The notions indicated by the author enable him to explain the phenomena of the peculiar conduct of enslaved and satanized individuals, which falsify the principle of rational action as a result of 'activity' in the individual personality spheres, i.e. id, ego and superego, which constitutes a response to the actions of the partner in an interaction. Paprzycki discerns two types of response of a given person depending on the kind of action performed by the partner. The unpleasant actions of another individual are in conflict with the demands of id and engender aggressive attitude. In turn, pleasant actions are satisfying for the id, so the persons strives to sustain them by responding with analogous pleasant action directed at the partner<sup>47</sup>. Such a linear dependency, where unpleasant actions are countered with unpleasant actions, while when confronted with pleasant action we respond likewise, is true up to a point. The individual, Paprzycki argues, possesses a certain upper limit of hostility of which they are capable. Once the threshold is exceeded, there appears anxiety which signals dangerous situation, and the individual responds to unpleasant action with diminishing aggressiveness, and at a certain point even submissiveness<sup>48</sup>. Paprzycki identifies the phenomenon with enslavement, a category of the non-Christian model of man.

As regards satanization, it may be explained in the light of Freudian psychoanalysis as aggression stemming from the inability to reciprocate extremely

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<sup>45</sup>Ibidem, p. 187.

<sup>46</sup>M. Paprzycki, *The Non-Christian Model of Man. An Attempt at a Psychoanalytic Explanation*, [in:] L. Nowak, M. Paprzycki (eds.), *Social System...*, p. 205–206.

<sup>47</sup>Ibidem, p. 206–207.

<sup>48</sup>Ibidem, p. 208.

positive actions of the interaction partner with positive actions. The norm of attitudinal reciprocation cannot be fulfilled, which leads ego to a conflict with id manifested in the aggression towards the person undertaking positive action of extremely high intensity<sup>49</sup>.

The non-Christian model of man, in itself criticising and limiting the concept the rational action, became an object of critique. In the paper entitled *Toward the Sophisticated Rationalistic Model of Man*, Robert Egiert presents a certain augmentation of the rational action concept<sup>50</sup>. Utilising the concept of authoritarian individual by Erich Fromm, Egiert attempts a different interpretation of the enslavement and satanization phenomena. The situations in which — according to the non-Christian model of man— the principle of rational action does not apply is presented by the author in a manner which does not contradict rationality<sup>51</sup>.

Following Fromm, Egiert quotes the notion of sadism, which he defines as a proclivity of one person to dominate another<sup>52</sup>. Moreover, the author di-

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<sup>49</sup>Ibidem, p. 209.

<sup>50</sup>I shall outline only the basic ideas of Egiert's; For the entire theory see: R. Egiert, *Toward the Sophisticated Rationalistic Model of Man*, [in:] L. Nowak, M. Paprzycki (eds.), *Social System...* A similar attempt at a critique of the non-Christian model of man was made by this author; for more see M. Ciesielski, *Niewolnictwo z rozsądku? Próba krytyki nie-Ewangelicznego modelu człowieka*, *Preteksty* 5, Poznań 2004.

<sup>51</sup>Furthermore, Egiert draws attention to the ambiguity of the terms of enslavement and satanization, the key elements for the understanding of the non-Christian model of man. Egiert claims that in one sense enslavement is defined by way of notions of hostility/kindness, in the second sense, it is defined by the category of preference realisation; the same applies in the case of satanization. Egiert writes: "Nowak defines enslavement in two ways. This is disturbing since he does not show how the two descriptions are interrelated. In one sense, enslavement comes from the fact that a person in the face of extreme enmity does not respond with hostility but with friendliness. In the other sense, enslavement consists in the fact that a person instead of satisfying his own preferences, fulfils his partner's preferences. A similar situation concerns satanization". R. Egiert, *Toward...*, p. 216. However, it seems that the above remark of Egiert's is unjustified and appears to display a touch of colloquial tendency to comprehend hostility/kindness from the standpoint of emotional attitudes. Meanwhile, explications provided by Nowak state explicitly that the notions of hostility/kindness are defined respectively by the realisation of the preferences of the enslaving one, and realisation of the counter-preferences of the satanizing one. Naturally, one may disagree with such a definition, but there is hardly any scope to see ambiguities there.

<sup>52</sup>Masochism, understood as the inclination for subordination, is a notion which Egiert also addresses, yet I choose to disregard it since has no bearing on the essence of criticism of the non-Christian model of man; for more, see: R. Egiert, *Toward...*, p. 218–219.

stinguishes two kinds of propensities for domination: the negative one, which manifests itself in hostile attitudes (inflicting pain) towards the other person, and a positive one, which consists in bribing the other person, showering them with gifts etc.

Defining those and other notions permits one to determine certain dependencies which govern the interactions of two persons. I will quote those which interest us the most as they relate to the criticism of the non-Christian model of man.

In the case of negative domination of person *X* over *Y*, *Y* initially responds with hostility to *X*'s hostile attitudes aiming to dominate the former, thus preventing *X* from accomplishing their goal. This causes radicalization of *X*'s hostile actions, which in consequence produces a situation where *Y* must either choose further hostile action towards *X*, as an expression of defence against domination, or allow themselves to be dominated by *X*. The most emphatically rational profit and loss account usually induces *Y* to submit to *X*<sup>53</sup>. In turn, in the case of *X*'s positive domination, when its intensity is not too high, *Y* is willing to submit, thus achieving certain goods given them by *X* in order to dominate the former. However, once a certain level of *X*'s positive domination over *Y* has been reached, *Y* enters the sphere of rebellion, because the rational reckoning of profit and loss indicates that the goods obtained from *X* do not compensate *Y* for the ever increasing incapacitation<sup>54</sup>.

In Egiert's opinion, both of the above dependencies in the interactions of two persons enable one to comprehend the phenomena described in the non-Christian model of man as enslavement and satanization without the need to reject the principle of rational action. The action consisting in submitting to negative domination as well as in rejecting positive domination, which may be identified — in Egiert's view — with enslavement and the principle of counter-rationality and with satanization and the principle of irrationality, may be interpreted as actions undertaken after conscious consideration and after having chosen the most advantageous solution for the one who undertakes it. In the first instance, the goal of rational action is the protection of existential values at the expense of one's freedom, whereas in the second, the preservation of one's freedom at the expense of received goods.

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<sup>53</sup>Ibidem, p. 224.

<sup>54</sup>Ibidem, p. 226.

Another critique was presented by this author<sup>55</sup>. An analysis of selected concepts of rational action by such authors as M. Weber, K.R. Popper, J. Watkins, C.G. Hemper and J. Kmita, warrants the thesis that there is an underlying assumption concerning the capacity for reflection on the part of the acting subject. It states that the subject of action is conscious of the various alternative courses of action and considers them with respect to efficacy, consciously calculates the usefulness of individual actions etc. The assumption may be formulated as the principle of continuous reflectiveness:

the principle of continuous reflectiveness: prior to taking each action. an individual always reflects on the alternative actions in order to determine which of the alternatives will allow that individual to accomplish their goal in the most advantageous manner<sup>56</sup>.

In a way, this assumption restricts the concept of rational action, since it does not permit to include other actions where the subject does not appear to be reflective. This covers actions described and habitual, routine, traditional, imitative, undertaken in an emotional state etc.

It also seems that the non-Christian model of man also presupposes the principle of continuous reflectiveness. The two principles of non-rational action conceptualised in the non-Christian model of man, namely the counter-rational and irrational action, are based on the presumption of reflectiveness of the acting subject. The very definition of counter- and irrationality reveals their reflective nature<sup>57</sup>:

the principle of counter-rationality: "from the set of alternative actions, one takes the action which is **thought** to lead to a result that ranks highest among the preferences of the oppressor";

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<sup>55</sup>For more on this topic see: M. Ciesielski, *Zagadnienie ograniczeń racjonalnego modelu działań ludzkich. Próba ujęcia działania nawykowo-racjonalnego*, Poznań 2012. Summary in English: idem, *Problem of Limits of Rational Model of Human Action. An Attempt to Capture Habitual-Rational Action*, *Studia Europaea Gnesnensia* 4, 2011, p. 393–398.

<sup>56</sup>For more, see: M. Ciesielski, *Zagadnienie ograniczeń...*, p. 66. Other authors also point to the reflectiveness of the acting subject; for instance, in his paper on the rationality of action, Eugeniusz Geblewicz writes about "planned manner" and "deliberation": "In terms of etymology, *ratio* means as much as reckoning, calculation. Thus in the first sense, *to act rationally* means to devise a plan of action and while carrying out an action to take the more or less remote outcomes of a given action into account. In other words, to proceed rationally is to act in a planned manner and with deliberation". E. Geblewicz, *Co znaczy "postępować racjonalnie"?*, *Prakseologia* 54, 1975, p. 26.

<sup>57</sup>L. Nowak, *U podstaw...*, p. 51.

the principle of irrationality: “from the set of alternative actions, one takes the action which is **thought** to lead to a result that ranks lowest among the preferences of the benefactor”;

[highlight in bold by this author].

That “thought” contained in both definitions betokens reflective comparison of individual alternative actions and consequently the selection of the appropriate one.

Other statements of Nowak’s concerning counter-rational actions in the situation of enslavement also admit supposition that the action is undertaken in a reflective manner. For instance, we read: “The enslaved is only the one who is not capable anymore of making any **estimates** of good and evil on their own, who instead **judges** with someone else’s **criteria** imprinted in their subconscious” [highlight in bold by this author]<sup>58</sup>. Hence, the enslaved person makes estimates, passes value judgements and chooses the courses of action; they act upon reflection, albeit not rationally, being guided by someone else’s selection criteria, not their own.

Therefore, the non-Christian model overcomes the limitation of the rational action approach which results from the assumption that in human actions the acting subject realizes only their own preferences. L. Nowak conceptualizes two types of non-rational action, in which a person chooses not to realize their own preferences, but those of their adversary or the counter-preferences of their benefactor. At the same time, following the rationalist approach, the author adopts the assumption postulating reflective nature of human practice. One may therefore censure Nowak’s concept for the one-sided view of human actions, i.e. as a result of reflective activity. Thus, the non-Christian concept, although it overcomes certain limitations of the rationality model, fails to account for the non-reflective action, just as the former model did.

## NON-CHRISTIAN MODEL OF MAN AS INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY

The theoretical dimension of the interdisciplinarity of humanities consists in adopting one set of anthropological premises, thanks to which the phenomena of the human world may be studied in a coherent fashion by scholars

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<sup>58</sup>Ibidem, p. 44.

representing various disciplines. The theory of rational action certainly aspires to the name of interdisciplinary concept, being utilised by researchers from different fields. Nevertheless, it seems that the non-Christian model of man by Leszek Nowak could equally well be a concept to be successfully employed in interdisciplinary research projects.

If it is assumed that the social world comprises three basic areas: the political, the economic and the cultural one, then the premises of the non-Christian model have been used as a research tool in the analysis of phenomena in all those areas.

And so, the first area in which the discussed model has been applied is political power. The political domination of one human being over another, where one person totally subordinates the will and consciousness of the other individual cannot be satisfactorily presented by means of the concept of rational action. It seems therefore that the phenomenon of a total enslavement of human masses by the not so numerous ruling elites (e.g. North Korea) is incomprehensible for the Western mind, for which the vision of rationalism, free will and human reflectiveness is the dominant research paradigm. Only by restricting this vision to a certain scope of social relationships and defining the principle of counter-rationality can one explain the phenomenon of maximising the preferences of the hostile political authority instead of one's own. Still other socio-political phenomena were described by the theory of power of the non-Marxian historical materialism, which is based on the non-Christian anthropology. Those phenomena include class rule, the class of the rulers, sphere of influence and the range of regulation.

The non-Christian model was also used to elucidate phenomena in economy. The model enables the description of the economic rule and pathological productivity, where the relationship between the directors of a plant, the manager etc and ordinary workers is something more than a relation between equal economic "partners", as it is usually presented by the liberal thought. Economic rule accomplishes a particular kind of economic enslavement, which consists in employee's adopting the system of values of their employers and its fullest realisation. The category of economic rule may serve to describe the so-called "rat-race", an expression which erroneously denotes that the phenomenon existing only among the employees, not among the employees and the employers.

The third principal social area is the domain of broadly understood culture. Here, the non-Christian model of man has also found its uses. The Gombrowiczian idea that the human spirit is not as reflective and intrinsic as the European vision of rationalism would have it, was interpreted by means of the terms in-



troduced by the discussed model. Human conduct is not determined only by the knowledge and preferences of the acting individual, but also by the social surroundings in which they find themselves. Then foregoing applies to science as well — a cultural domain where, according to the popular opinion, reflectiveness and individual thinking should be in abundance. Among other things, the non-Christian model enables one to understand the phenomenon of spiritual enslavement, which manifests itself in culture as the phenomenon of provincialism. The essential feature of provincial thought is its submissiveness with regard to authors of the intellectual centre. Artists, priests or scientists who make their creative efforts in the province, renounce independent thinking and adopt the ready-made styles, norms and values developed by the centre's cultural elites.

Leszek Nowak's non-Christian model of man overcomes certain conceptual limitations of the rational action model. Consequently, the non-Christian model renders it possible to express not only the theses relating to rational action but also to describe the counter-rational actions, which consist in realising preferences of persons who display very hostile attitude towards us, as well as irrational actions, which consist in realising counter-preferences of those whose attitude towards us is too benevolent. If the model of rational action is utilised in various disciplines of science, including economics, political sciences sociology, history and cultural studies, and therefore it possesses the merits of interdisciplinary theory, it seems that the non-Christian model may be an even more effective tool of interdisciplinary research. The model could become a conceptual foundation for the description of phenomena in the political, economic and cultural domain.

Popularization of Leszek Nowak's anthropological concept would certainly contribute to its use in interdisciplinary projects, especially those undertaken by young researchers, who are all too quick to abandon the domestic research tradition and seek inspiration only in Western thought.

Mieszko Ciesielski

**LESZKA NOWAKA NIEEWANGELICZNY MODEL CZŁOWIEKA  
A PROBLEM INTERDYSCYPLINARNOŚCI NAUK HUMANISTYCZNYCH**

**Streszczenie**

Autor w artykule porusza zagadnienia związane z problematyką teorii działania w kontekście interdyscyplinarności badań humanistycznych. W tekście przybliżony

został tzw. nieewangeliczny model człowieka skonceptualizowany przez polskiego filozofa Leszka Nowaka, który — zdaniem autora — może stać się efektywnym narzędziem eksplanacyjnym w badaniach prowadzonych w sposób interdyscyplinarny.

W tekście podjęto próbę rozjaśnienia pojęcia interdyscyplinarności badań naukowych. Jednym z jej aspektów jest jedność teoretyczna, czyli przyjęcie przez badaczy różnych dyscyplin naukowych jednego zestawu twierdzeń wyjaśniających. Autor wskazuje, że teoria działania racjonalnego odgrywała i nadal odgrywa rolę swoistej podstawy teoretycznej nauk humanistycznych — politologii, ekonomii, socjologii, prawoznawstwa, pedagogiki itp.

Model działania racjonalnego zawiera jednakże dość istotne ograniczenia, m.in. to, że podmiot działający zawsze maksymalizuje własne preferencje, co czasami nie jest prawdą. Omówiony w artykule nieewangeliczny model człowieka przewycięża to ograniczenie, co sprawia, że może być efektywną poznawczo podstawą prowadzenia badań o charakterze interdyscyplinarnym. W tekście znajduje się również przybliżenie dotychczasowych zastosowań omawianej koncepcji w różnych dyscyplinach wiedzy. To zaś można potraktować jako argument przemawiający za nieewangelicznym modelem człowieka.

