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"Παλινδι?ία", E. Berneker, "R. E.", XVIII, 1949, 3 : [recenzja]

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supposed to be the court known in Pharaonic Egypt by the term *Knbt*, the autor makes an extensive survey of the various meanings of this rather obscure term, of the members who formed this court, and finally of its sphere of competence. It seems that one can distinguish three main kinds of *Knbt* forming three jurisdictions placed one above the other: 1) the local *Knbt* without epithet, 2) the *Knbt* of notables of Memphis, 3) the Great Council of *Knbt* held at Memphis or at Heliopolis, but which had jurisdiction over the whole nome or even over the larger region of Egypt. It is probable, that the Ptolemies invested the local *Knbt* either in the villages or in the towns with jurisdiction and in order to repeal or reform their judgments in case of need, they adopted a system which was equally applied to the Chrematistae by keeping the inquirers of the previous epoch as an itinerant court of appeal. Under the common name of the Laocritae these courts constituted a jurisdiction of two degrees. The author discusses the competence and procedure of the Laocritae (p. 19$_{27}$) and proceeds to a discussion about the foundation and competence of the itinerant court of Chrematistae (28—31).

E. BERNEKER, Παλινδικία (Extr. from Pauly-Wissowa *R. E.* XVIII 3, 1949).

Παλινδικία means in broader sense every repeated carrying of law-suits after a judgement pronounced (appeals are excepted). Παλινδικία in its narrower sense means the legally reopening of law-suits περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν i. e. a reopening proceeding in court on the basis of an objection against a judgement by default or on the basis of a retrial. The author follows the evolution of the παλινδικία in Greece (Attic and Doric Law) and Egypt (Ptolemaic and Roman period). Ἀναδικεῖν i. e. reopening of law-suits was admissible without any restriction. Sentences of single officers were not of juristic force. But there was a possibility to neutralize this inconvenience. This was done by two means: the litigant parties could make a declaration by which they submitted themselves to the decision of the judge. They could also stipulate a contractual fine in the case of reopening a new law-suit. The king could also intervene with a decree by which an ἀναδικεῖν was declared inadmissible. This happened in case of a false accusation or if a blackmail was intended. The verdicts of the king, or of a court representing the king were not subject to reexamination by an another judge and

could not be annulled. The sentences of the Greek courts, of the Chrematists and of *the ten judges* were also of legal force. It seems however that the legal procedure admitted new proceedings and a new decision in two cases: *a*) a renewal of the law-suit by a third person, by the means of an intervention (Lille I 29 Col. I), *b*) a renewal of the law-suit after a judicial suspension (intermission) of the proceedings (Princ. III 6). In the Roman period the principle *ne bis de eadem re sit actio* prevails. The tendency appears in courts to take notice of the sentence *ex officio* whereas in Rome this was maintained by the means of an exception (BGU 613).

E. BERNEKER, Παραμονή (R. E. XVIII 3, 1949).

The expression known to common Greek Law has two different meanings: *a*) a contractually established legal power upon a person during of which the right of movement of the person subject to this power is suspended (in case of debts, in case of manumission); *b*) the duty not to leave a place. In connection with this are: *a*) the processual obligation to appear in court *b*) the surety for attendance of a liturgist.

E. BERNEKER, Πάρεδροι (Pauly-Wissowa *R. E.* XVIII 4, 1950).

The author deals in this article with the πάρεδροι in Greece, in the Ptolemaic kingdom, in Rome and in the Roman provinces especially in Egypt.

R. TAUBENSCHLAG, *The legal profession in Greco-Roman Egypt* (S. A. aus *Festschrift Schultz*).

It is quite certain that in the Ptolemaic period judges and assessors — no matter whether members of collegiate or single courts — possessed some knowledge of law. This knowledge may have been acquired in gymnasiums in connection with studies in rhetorics. The Ptolemaic period did not know πραγματικοί, jurisconsults who assisted the ῥήτορες in court as experts and suggested them the provisions to be quoted. It knew however advocates (συνήγοροι) who were evidently under state control. They probably acquired their knowledge like the judges also in gymnasiums. At the beginning of the Roman period, the prefect, the supreme judge was hardly a man with legal education. It is however probable that their assessors possessed a smattering of law. But at the end of the third century the situation seems to have changed and judges seem chiefly to be men equipped with legal knowledge. In the II cent.